The Role of Un-Free Speech, Political Correctness, and Islamic Doctrines

If I were writing and publishing this article in Sweden, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, or the UK, I could probably expect to be in court, heavily fined, or even jailed with little confidence of receiving a just hearing. When nations shield “protected classes” from criticism or fail to prosecute even-handedly criminals because of their “protected class,” they encourage lawlessness within that class and in general. They also incur the just resentment of the lawful citizens who endure these crimes. When nations punish those who speak out against such policies and their consequences, they silence truth and conscience and cross the boundaries of just government into totalitarian government. This also applies to the European Union, which has been inspiring and pushing its members into the misguided social manipulations of multiculturalism and diversity with a sharp totalitarian edge.

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Stealth Jihad for Transforming America

A September 29, 2015,  Center for Security Policy (CSP) article indicated that more than 50 U.S. intelligence analysts working with the U.S. Central Command had filed complaints with the Department of Defense Inspector General claiming that their analyses had been manipulated by senior officials to downplay the threat of ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. The alleged motive for these omissions and manipulations was to present a picture of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Syrian War that supported Obama Administration ideology and policy.

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Demonstrating Lack of Resolve, Misguided Negotiation Expectations, and Limited Strategic Outlook - Part 8 (Mistakes 9, 10, and 11 of 13)

From early 1965 through early 1968, there were six major confrontations between Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the Pacific Area Commander (CINCPAC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).  These involved a number of Johnson-McNamara policies and strategies that CINCPAC Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp and the JCS believed severely hindered the defeat of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. After the war and his retirement, Admiral Sharp even wrote a book titled Strategies for Defeat: Vietnam in Perspective, first published in 1978. It was Sharp who characterized Johnson’s Operation Rolling Thunder as “powder-puff air warfare.” A major issue with Sharp and the JCS was the Johnson-McNamara policy of  highly restricted bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam, leaving huge enemy sanctuaries around the most strategic North Vietnamese military and logistical targets critical to their invasion of South Vietnam. President Nixon eventually reversed this costly and absurd policy.

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Failure to Mobilize the Support and Will of the People - Part 7

Prussian General and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) insisted that any successful theory of warfare had to balance what he called “the trinity of war.” This concerned the motivation and morale affecting the people, the government, and the Army. The support and will of all three had to be mobilized to accomplish strategic objectives and victory. Moreover, successful military strategies should undermine the morale of the enemy’s people, government, and Army.

The French did not withdraw from Indo-China solely because of their defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. They withdrew because the French people were war weary from World War II and Algeria, and the Communists had been relentless in exploiting this war weariness by undermining the morale of the French people and Parliament. It is a significant footnote in history that Marx, Engels, and Lenin had studied Clausewitz’s 1831 unfinished work: On War, and incorporated many of his principles, including “the trinity of war” in Communist political and military doctrine. Mao also studied Clausewitz.

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Not Knowing the True Nature of the Enemy - Part 6 (An Even Bigger Problem Today)

The most famous quote of Sun Tzu, the Chinese general and philosopher (circa 544 to 496 BC) and author of The Art of War, is:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.”

Sun Tzu (Master Sun), whose birth name was Sun Wu, must have considered this vitally important , because he said it at least four different times with slight variations.

He also emphasized the importance of the intelligence function in warfare.  This seems to include a much broader outlook than simply the military strength, weapons, and positions of the enemy. It is of utmost importance to know what motivates the enemy and what our own motivations are. We must be honest about our own motivations and predispositions to believe what is most comfortable to us rather than the hard facts of reality.  Alexander Solzhenitsyn once wrote: “We do not err because truth is difficult to see. It is visible at a glance. We err because this is more comfortable.”  Military Intelligence is most useful, when as far as humanly possible; it conforms to the reality of the enemy’s strength, morale, ideology, and motivation. It is useless, when it conforms to wishful thinking, political pressures, self-deception, or humanist fantasies about human nature.  

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